feat: support compose secrets via podman secret store#30
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validate_secrets picks the source by string-ness (isinstance(def.get(k), str)),
but secret_create_lines/secret_referenced_variables branched on "file" in def
(key presence). A def like {file: [x], environment: VAR} validated as an env
secret yet crashed raw in the file branch (TypeError in Path), violating the
refuse-loudly contract. Align emission with validation's string-ness check.
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Summary
Add compose
secretssupport — the first Bucket B feature (real translation, not a flag pass-through). Top-levelfile:/environment:secret definitions become pod-namespacedpodman secret createcalls; service references becomepodman run --secretmounts at/run/secrets/<target>; the store is torn down in the existing EXIT trap.external: trueis rejected (honest-subset boundary).A new deep module
compose2pod/secrets.pyowns the translation:parsing.pygates it,emit.pyweaves the store lifecycle in. Import direction is one-way (emit/parsing → secrets → keys/shell/exceptions).What's supported
secrets:with exactly onefile:(host path, resolved against--project-dir,${VAR}expands at run time) orenvironment:(piped viaprintf '%s' "${VAR-}").secrets:short form[name]and full long form{source, target, uid, gid, mode}(modeint→octal string, string passthrough).<pod>-<name>) isolate concurrent CI runs; trap removes them alongside the pod.referenced_variables()stderr note.Security hardening
The whole-branch review found command injection: secret names and env-var names flowed into generated shell raw (they can't be
shlex.quoted like values). Closed by charset-validating both at the gate:^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*$, env-var names^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$— every admitted char is shell-inert in an unquoted single token.re.fullmatch(an initialre.matchadmitted a trailing\n, since$matches before a newline — that reopened injection by splitting the shell line).uid/gid/modereject non-scalar/bool; the whole--secretarg isshlex.quoted.file-key presence, so a malformed mixed def is refused loudly rather than crashing raw.An independent opus re-review confirmed no remaining injection path (charset shell-inert, ASCII classes reject unicode,
MULTILINEunset, every emit path gated byvalidate).Testing
just test-ciat 100% coverage (247 tests),just lint-ciclean,just check-planningOK. Validation accept/reject matrix, emission (file/env create lines,--secretopts, mode int/string, pod-namespacing, trapsecret rm, referenced vars), injection regressions (metachar, newline, unicode-adjacent), and anemit_scriptintegration.Docs / planning
planning/changes/2026-07-10.02-secrets.mdarchitecture/supported-subset.md